Social Democracy, like the wider Left is, to put it no stronger, not doing very well. The government of Scholz led to a right-wing government and the rise of the AfD, Trump succeeded Biden, while after one year, Starmer’s government is struggling and is lagging in the polls, not below the Conservatives but Farage’s Reform party. Things may be a bit better in Spain, but this can hardly challenge the overall picture. In this context it does seem reasonable to ask the various progressive currents how they assess this situation and their thoughts on a possible response. Here I focus on social democracy.
The conjuncture: it is far from clear to me how social democrats assess the present conjuncture. Important challenges like the climate crisis, or the rise of inequalities of all kinds, are more often discussed than addressed in a serious manner. In the last few years, they seem to have gone even further down the list of priorities of the mainstream agenda, as Rearm Europe takes centre stage. Are we in one of those periods in capitalism where one consensus is breaking up and another is yet to be established, as in the transition from the first period of liberal globalisation to the post WWII social democratic consensus, or as in the 1970s which began the period of transition towards neoliberalism? If so, then social democracy needs some clarity on its strategic vision of the future, sentimental harking back to a “golden age” of the past will be of little help.
The rise of the far right: this seems inexorable even if people on the progressive side of the political spectrum would consider that most of the solutions offered would make the problems worse. Thinkers like Thomas Frank or Michael Sandel have argued that the rise of the Far Right is a direct consequence of the centre-left abandoning its social base during the neoliberal consensus. This opened the space for the new right to mobilise that base on a cultural agenda. Part of this cultural agenda has been a hostility to immigration and refugees. Is there any evidence that trying to incorporate some of that agenda manages to marginalise the far right rather than legitimising it?
Sandel goes even further: Democrats in the US, and social democrats in Europe have not only abandoned their traditional social base but have, especially during the period when they adopted the Third Way approach, actually disdained it, suggesting that the reason they face problems is somehow their own fault, refusing to invest in their education, to move to where their jobs are etc. The Far Right, in the years before the financial crisis of 2008, consciously focused on the losers of globalisation, as the centre-left was as likely as the centre-right to have praised that globalisation and supported an agenda of privatisation, deregulation, and liberalisation of labour markets. Does social democracy need to work towards a new model of production that can address both the climate and inequality crises? Was the Third Way, as a whole, or in part, a mistake?
Party organisation: is there any prospect of returning to the supposed stability of the two-party system, with the two parties often gaining more than 80% of the electorate and taking turns to form a government? Is such a prospect even desirable as a goal? The abandonment of the social base was reflected in the rise of cartel parties. Here the parties of the centre-left and centre-right weakened party democracy and the relationship with their base in favour of a closer relationship with the state – its resources becoming their key source of power. At the same time, while keeping the rhetorical rivalry between themselves, both parties severely reduced the substance of their policy disagreements, especially over issues of economic policy. Weren’t such arrangements behind the populist resentment of the elites of established parties that seemed to offer no real alternatives during the elections?
Power: The rise in neoliberalism was caused by and led to an enormous shift in power between the financial system and governments, between employers and workers, between the private and public sector. Most of all the rise of in income and wealth inequality entailed that elites could translate their increasing economic power into political power, influencing the political system and the rules that regulate it. Do social democrats seriously consider that they can begin to address a progressive economic and social agenda without a serious reversal of power in favour of working people? And does not this entail a strategy to empower them? Could post-war social democracy have become hegemonic without the strength of trade unions for instance?
These questions are strategic in nature. Clearly, I could have focused on more pressing and specific policy options: do social democrats think that rearmament will provide a new economic model of growth which will provide space for redistribution, or, do they need to challenge the right’s view that taxes must always be reduced thereby prioritising private over collective consumption. I will return to such questions in the future.
For the moment I need to stress that if we do not have answers to such strategic questions, it is difficult to believe that the social democrats will regain a hegemonic position within the political system. Lack of clarity in these issues creates a suspicion that this is a strategic choice: appealing to an excessively wide audience by papering over difficult questions and contradictions. It does not seem to be as strategy that is working.
The greek version of this article was published in EFSYN on 28/6/2025